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Introduction
From unfathomable acts of terrorism, to natural disasters, to popular uprisings, the past
decade has seen democratic nations placed in precarious situations that at times threaten the very
underpinnings of governmental processes, societies, and economies. Unprecedentedly rapid
globalization of the planet has certainly exacerbated this situation, in which information cannot
be contained (outside of China and in countries like Libya where, in the midst of a political and
civil meltdown, Cisco has reported a complete halt in Internet traffic moving in and out of
Libyan territory).
Even fairly open societies like the U.S. and Great Britain have not been immune to such
threatening situations. Perhaps because the ideological democracy that underpins bastions of
freedom like the U.S. and the UK promotes citizens’ abilities to denounce government, take
issue with its policies, and exercise their opinions at the ballot box, these countries may be said
to be in more difficult positions than countries like China and Libya with regard to situations that
would threaten governmental instability. Though more stable than governments that can simply
turn off civil rights and freedoms whenever they feel the need, there is consequently a greater
need to be responsible, to maintain a level of accountability, and to perpetuate trust in
government.
To be sure, these are quite vague notions. Nevertheless, severe crisis situations have
rattled both countries in recent years and called public confidence into question. In the U.S., the
2008 economic meltdown exposed a significant amount of greed in America’s private sector
while also calling into question Congress’ ability to govern. Striking to the heart of much of the
ideological difference between Democrats and Republicans, the policy response to economic
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issues exposed much of the deadlock in Washington, against which so many politicians
campaign on a platform denouncing ‘politics as usual’ and a Washington described as
fundamentally ‘broken.’ The Democrats are all for taking more control, passing stimulus
budgets that pump more money into the economy with stricter federal government regulation of
the financial sector. The Republicans are all for laissez-faire economics combined with reduced
federal government powers, giving power back to businesses and individuals to initiate an
economic trickle-down effect. Putting aside political biases and points of view that lead
Americans to argue opinion as if it were fact (no one is innocent of this), on a purely ideological
level these differences are valid; there is no absolute right or wrong.
What is problematic about these differences is that legislators so steadfastly believe their
opinions to be right and their opponents’ wrong that they will oppose all efforts from across the
aisle that would pass into law a plan ideologically out of step with their beliefs. The American
system of governance enables such gridlock: a system predisposed to status quo (and for good
reason), it allows as few as one legislator in the minority party to block legislation or as little as
the president’s refusal to sign a bill to stymie a year’s worth of legislative effort. In response, the
mechanism to overturn blocked legislation requires such a level of agreement as to make it
increasingly difficult to achieve. Compromise then becomes the word of the day: compromise
between legislators to get something done, and compromised legislation that results.
The UK has also faced many significant crises, oftentimes of the same nature as those
that have taken their toll on America. From concern over effectiveness of the National Health
Service—the UK’s socialized and nationalized health system—to economic woes following the
2008 global economic downturn, the British legislature has had to respond to significant
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problems, with citizens looking to Parliament for answers and expecting answers of the worldclass caliber that the Westminster government is supposed to provide.
Though the crises affecting cousins across the pond are oftentimes similar, the legislative
and policy responses are quite different. As the Brits look to tighten their belt, making cuts to
public services and increasing taxes, the U.S. chooses to extend the Bush tax cuts that were
expected to sunset at the end of 2010. Those familiar with the parliamentary style of legislating
(which from an outside perspective seems inordinately complex—perhaps the only thing more
difficult for an American to understand than the Westminster government and the electoral
process that enables it is Cockney rhyme slang: check Wikipedia to find out what the phrase ‘to
tell a porkie’ has to with telling a lie) will not be surprised by such a distinction. The disparity
lies buried beneath the greatest difference between the Westminster parliamentary model and the
American presidential model: where the U.S. system is status quo based, the party in power in
the UK can, with limits, pass through whatever legislation it likes, regardless of the dismay that
legislation may cause to minority parties in opposition.
This distinction underscores a longstanding dialogue within American Political Science
in an attempt to address why the American government is so unable to respond with policy,
either in normal or extreme circumstances. Much brainpower has been expended by the likes of
significant political scientists to come to the conclusion that the fault is not cultural but
structural. The notion that Washington is broken is a recent one, yet at every significant point in
American politics over the past fifty years there has been an outcry that the American system of
government is ineffective. Outcries have existed in spite of the fact that the degree of inter-party
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animosity in D.C. has not always been so—indeed animosity has increased steadily over time.1
Nonetheless, there is significant muscle behind the structural argument: the American
government’s inability to ‘get things done,’ both in times of normalcy and crisis, is the legacy of
a unique system of checks and balances, separation of powers, and constitutional provisions that,
by design, make change hard to come by.
Critics such as James Sundquist (via the Brookings Institute), David Samuels of the
University of Minnesota, and Matthew Shugart of UCSD take a keen interest in the Westminster
model’s fluidity of response and relative ease of enacting legislation. Sundquist argues for
constitutional and structural changes to enable a parliamentary system, and Samuels and Shugart
scrutinize the virtues and vices of presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems (the
virtues heavily on the side of the parliamentary model as they discuss the inherent inferiority of
presidential and semi-presidential systems). Acknowledging that an overall switch to a
parliamentary model—if America even desired to adopt such a system, which it does not—will
not happen, they nevertheless highlight several areas upon which the U.S. could evolve and
improve. At least as far as Sundquist is concerned, those reforms are straight out of the
parliamentary model textbook.
Their respective arguments, interesting as they may be, lack the credibility to be
considered seriously. The analysis is topical; if America is the tortoise, Britain is the hare. The
tortoise moves too slowly. Therefore, the hare is what we need. On the surface, and in
comparison to the tortoise, the hare may appear perfectly suited to solve the problem, but the
argument does not dissect the hare to discover any innate issues residing underneath the surface
that may make the hare undesirable.
1

For more on inter-party animosity, a colleague has addressed the diminution of collegiality among Members of
Congress. See Evan Philipson’s “Bringing Down the House: The Causes and Effects of the Decline of Personal
Relationships in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Available online via CUREJ.
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Just as the U.S. has experienced serious challenges to its system of government in even
the past presidential term, so too have there been catastrophic events in and around Westminster
in recent years. Looking as recently as two years back, this treatise looks to the constitutional
reform effort and package that was put forth in 2009 in response to a devastating scandal
whereby it was revealed that dishonesty and cheating ran rampant among the expense accounts
of members of the House of Commons. Secondly, this research looks at the currently evolving
British response to the 2008 financial downturn, which is taking shape in a hard-hitting austerity
plan of cutbacks in public services and tax increases codenamed “The Big Society” and from
which few Britons can escape completely. The current Coalition government has pushed through
benefit cuts and tax increases through a more or less across the board 19% budget cut to
government departments, and an increase in the VAT to 20% effective January 4th, 2011 (VAT
had been temporarily set at 15% from December 2008, returning to 17.5% in January 2010).1
There is no argument to be made here with regard to which system is patently superior.
They are both flawed (oftentimes for different, but sometimes for the same, reasons); that
Sundquist, Samuels and Shugart nevertheless believe the Westminster model is superior damages
their arguments from the outset. Pros and cons abound in both, and upon inspection the oftreferred to Churchill quote that ‘democracy is the worst form of government… except for all the
rest’ comes to mind. Rather, the following pages serve to understand and question the way that
Parliament has dealt with stressful situations. The more its method of response and the remedies
on which it has settled are examined, the clearer it becomes that the UK is not necessarily the
best place to turn to deal with American procedural woes. Though the comparison between the

1

Unknown. “HM Revenue & Customs: Accounting for VAT When the Standard Rate of VAT Returned to 17.5 Per
Cent.” hmrc.gov.uk. HM Revenue & Customs, n.d. Web. 1 March 2011. <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/formsrates/rates/rate-changes.htm>.
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U.S. and the UK does not vet all the possible governmental models, the evidence against using
parliamentary reform to solve stateside issues is strong enough to question whether in fact we
should be turning to other governments to look for how to amend our own.
The following essay will argue that instead of continuing to suggest that the U.S.
government is inherently flawed and inferior to other governmental models, analysis of the
American system must recognize that its system presents unique challenges like any other. The
essay is comprised of extensive archival research and field research conducted in London. By
spending time in and around Westminster and interviewing politicians, economists, journalists,
and academics, this work attempts to back up the opinions here presented with a complete and
differentiated suite of expert analysis. Ultimately, the conclusion is that instead of searching for
a way to abandon the American system of government, the time and energy of America’s
political scientists would be better spent learning how to repair, sidestep, inoculate, or eradicate
the issues caused by the American system of governance; the suggestions put forth by such an
analysis would at least have the potential to translate into reforms that could in fact be effected.

6

Background
The American System
To placate both Federalists and anti-Federalists, the framers of the U.S. Constitution were
forced to compromise to reach an agreement that both protected states’ rights and vested
supervisory power in a national government. Both because the system was based upon
compromise and because the form of democracy was a great experiment, former President of the
Brookings Institute Bruce MacLaury acknowledges that “the framers themselves, when they
adjourned after that hot summer in Philadelphia, were the first to acknowledge that their
handiwork was less than perfect and that, as the nation gained experience under the Constitution,
it would have to reexamine its provisions and, as necessary, modify them.”1 If the framers
intended the Constitution to be amended, they certainly did not make it an easy feat to
accomplish. To do so, either 2/3 of both houses of Congress must propose an amendment or 2/3
of state legislatures must call upon Congress, via a national convention, to propose an
amendment. Subsequently, 3/4 of state legislatures, or conventions in 3/4 of the states, must
approve the amendment. Thus, as time goes on and America and Americans become more and
more content with the Constitution by precedent, the process renders amendments possible only
in cases of unusual unanimity.
It is unsurprising that of the Constitution’s twenty-seven amendments, only two have
affected the nature of governmental institutions. Still, as Sundquist points out, neither of those

1

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page v.
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two adjusted the distribution of power among the branches of government and its institutions.1
The Seventeenth amendment addressed the manner in which Senators would be elected,
providing that they be directly elected by the populace rather than appointed by state legislatures,
and the Twenty-second amendment limited a president to two terms in office. While these
amendments did have an important impact on governance and politics, they did not alter the
structures of government or how those structures interoperate.
That amendments addressing the structural design of the American government have
been few and far between is not only a symptom of the process required to amend the
Constitution; polarization vis-à-vis party politics has also played a role in preventing
amendments. As the directive under which the government operates, the Constitution exists
circumscribed within a continually evolving nation. Since ratification, the political landscape
has been increasingly characterized by a degree of polarization (fueled by the two-party system)
that the founders neither intended nor welcomed; warnings against factions are to be found in
Madison’s Federalist No. 51 and in George Washington’s farewell address as President.
Coupled by separation of powers, party organization is uniquely complicated in a presidential
system (relative to a parliamentary system). Parties “are presidentialized because the executive
election rather than factors specific to legislative elections drive legislative party success.”2
Additionally,
“under parliamentarism’s fusion of executive and legislative authority, parties organize to win legislative seats, and
retain maximum accountability over their prime-ministerial agents. Yet under the separation of origin and/or
survival, parties face different organizational and behavioral incentives. When voters have two agents—the
legislative party and a president—parties face more complex intraparty delegation and accountability problems.

1

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 3.
2
Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart. Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of
Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Page 127.
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Moreover, when winning the executive branch directly—rather than winning legislative seats—becomes parties’
1
driving goal, parties must favor ‘vote-seeking’ incentives in election campaigns.”

It is this level of polarization that has so often proved an impediment to Congress’ ability
to act. Any bills that address issues outside of minutia or that are in any way controversial have
a propensity to be held hostage by the parties, used as pawns in the perpetual chess game
between the Democrats and Republicans. The ability to obstruct legislation from progressing
through Congress is certainly enabled by the design of the American government. There is a
time and place where deference to the status quo is useful, e.g. where popular opinion overrides
logic or the well-being of certain demographics. This power is increasingly abused, to say
nothing of situations where the status quo is wrong, e.g. laws hampering the extension of civil
rights to African Americans in the 1950’s and ‘60’s.
‘Obamacare’ is a useful example. The status quo must be overcome, as the current state
of healthcare in the U.S. is dire to say the least. Legitimate differences in opinion regarding how
to alleviate the problems notwithstanding, abuse of the structures and procedures of American
government led to the bill being so compromised as to render the package dysfunctional the day
it was signed into law. Exploitation of the separation of powers between the president and the
legislature and the difficulty associated with mustering a sixty-senator majority to prevent a
Republican filibuster from occurring caused President Obama and Democratic Congressional
leadership to trade ideology for action. In making such a trade, the effort risks being reduced to
a political stunt—a bullet in the chamber to showcase success in future election campaigns—and
nothing more.

1

Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart. Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of
Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Page 162.
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How Should the U.S. Reform Its System?
One can certainly understand the great deal of research put into analyzing and trying to
find solutions for a system that appears to be broken. To wit, the cry against ‘politics as usual’
has become ‘politics as usual.’ Under the leadership of Douglas Dillon, a committee was put
together to find a solution. The Committee on the Constitutional System (CCS), formed in 1981,
concluded that the problem lies “with a system which promotes divisiveness and makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to develop truly national policies.”1 Specifically, CCS’ efforts
examined five questions highlighted by Sundquist:
1. “Would an electoral system that encouraged unified party control of the three centers of
decisionmaking—presidency, Senate, and House—make for more effective, responsible,
and accountable government?
2. Would longer terms for the president or for legislators, and a longer span between
elections, enable leaders to rise to a higher level of statesmanship in confronting crucial
issues, permit the resolution of issues that now go unresolved because of the short twoyear life of each successive Congress, and allow greater deliberation and care in the
legislative process?
3. Can a better solution be devised to deal with the immobility of government brought
about by leadership failure, or deadlock and quarreling between the president and the
Congress, than simply waiting around helplessly until the next presidential election
comes around?
4. Can harmonious collaboration between the executive and legislative branches be
introduced through formal interlocking of the branches or through the political parties
that are the web that binds administrators and legislators to a common purpose?
5. Should any of the constitutional checks and balances by which the executive and
legislative branches are enabled to thwart each other be modified to permit one or the
other branch to prevail more readily and thus facilitate decisions?”2

1

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 11.
2
Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Pages 10-11.
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The Argument for Parliamentary Reforms
What would be expected from a system that unifies party control over the executive and
legislative branches, interlocks said branches, increases the amount of time between elections for
legislators, provides a mechanism to abandon an ineffective government, and provides for the
dominant position of a particular branch? No scholar of models of democracy will be surprised
to learn that the CSS was quite enamored with the parliamentary model. Dillon “has suggested
that the answer to this country’s governmental stalemate ‘could well be some form of
parliamentary democracy.’”1 Former Senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
committee J. William Fulbright commended “the parliamentary system, with its unification of
the executive and legislature, as in many ways ‘a superior form of democracy.’”2 The hallmarks
of the parliamentary model are as follows:
“In parliamentary democracy the voters elect a legislature. The members of the legislature, in turn, elect the
3
executive. Executive authority, vested in a cabinet headed by a prime minister, derives from the results of
parliamentary elections, and not directly from the voice of the people. Moreover, the prime minister and the cabinet
are agents of the parliamentary majority, to whom they are accountable: that is, the executive serves at the pleasure
4
of the legislative majority.”

In the parliamentary model, a “legislative majority is [therefore] sovereign, and a committee of
that majority—the cabinet—both leads the legislature and directs the executive branch. Strong

1

Tufts University address, May 30, 1982, in Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. Page 19.
2
J. William Fulbright with Seth P. Tillman, The Price of an Empire (Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 45, in Sundquist,
James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992.
Page 19.
3
Footnote from Samuels & Shugart: “For present purposes it does not matter if the legislature is unicameral or
bicamerial.”
4
Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart. Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of
Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Page 26.
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party discipline assures prime ministers and their cabinets that they normally can act quickly and
decisively without fear of being repudiated by their legislatures.”1
These are fairly convincing arguments. As aforementioned, however, a wholesale switch to a
parliamentary system will never happen. The process for amending the Constitution is too
difficult. Additionally, even if our governmental model could be changed, Americans would not
want to. We are proud of our system, broken as it may be. We are proud of the constitutional
ideals that underpin the system. And we are proud of our independence. In the eyes of some, if
not those of many, to go back to a parliamentary system would be to admit failure of the
principles on which the U.S. was founded and the superiority of a system of government from
which we tried so hard to break away.
At least one significant member of the CCS shared this view. Co-chair Lloyd Cutler pulled
back to more practical solutions by suggesting that “‘the most one can hope for is a set of modest
changes that would make our structure work somewhat more in the manner of a parliamentary
system, with somewhat less separation between the executive and the legislature than now
exists.’”2

1

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 18.
2
“To Form a Government,” p. 139, in Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. Page 19.
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Manifestation of Reforms

Longer Term Lengths
If the U.S. were to alter its system in accordance with Cutler’s recommendations, what
would reform look like? As to term length, concern has been voiced that the 2-6-4-year term
lengths for House members, senators, and presidents, respectively, hurts politicians’ ability to
focus on policy. Short term lengths require politicians to spend a significant amount of their
time campaigning. Additionally, Sundquist suggests that shorter term lengths reduce the
honeymoon period when Congress and the White House are likely to work together towards
accomplishing agenda points.1 CCS suggests a 4-8-4 schedule, more in line with the
Westminster model, in which a government lasts five years and the prime minister is free to set a
General Election whenever (s)he chooses.2,3 Though this would not eliminate the issues
associated with term lengths, it would shorten the period when the legislative process is stymied
by campaign concerns.

1

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 145.
2
Ironically, the Coalition government has currently put forth a Bill (the Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill 2010-11) that,
if passed, would fix the length of Parliament at five years from the date of first sitting. Elections would be held on
the first Thursday in May. At present, the bill is in committee stage in the Lords.
3
Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 159.
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Broader Use of Impeachment

In situations where leadership fails, Sundquist argues for an expansion of the
impeachment clause.1 It should grow, he posits, to include failures of “maladministration.”2
Given broader utility, impeachment would function similarly to a parliamentary vote of no
confidence. In the Westminster model, if a majority of the House of Commons loses faith in a
government, a vote of no confidence requires either that the government resigns and a new
government be created, or that the sovereign dissolves Parliament and call a General Election.
Similarity notwithstanding, broader impeachment and votes of no confidence remain disparate:
an impeachment conviction merely removes the official in question and reaches down the chain
of command to replace him/her, rather than removing the entire government. Thus, even if
failures of maladministration were impeachable, the procedure still would not address overall
governmental failure. On the other hand, one could argue that separation of powers leads to a
compartmentalization of power in which it might be more useful to simply dispose of one bad
compartment rather than shutting down the entire operation. The intended operation of the
Titanic is a useful analogy: if one section of the hull became compromised and took on water, it
would be sealed off from the rest of the boat, sacrificing that section and those in it at the time to
ensure survival of the rest. It is not certain that expanded use of impeachment could address
stalemate in government. Still, such reform would cause the U.S. to operate more like a
parliament.

1

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 204.
2
Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page p. 204.
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Interlocking of Branches
An interlocking of government branches and the more unified party control that would
result would cause the U.S. to move away from separation of powers. This is one of the biggest
structural differences between the American and British systems of government. Such a reform
considers “either putting legislators in the executive branch or putting officials of that branch—
usually cabinet members—in the legislature.”1 Termed ‘dual officeholding,’ CSS has suggested
that “repeal of the clause would ‘broaden both the range of talent available to a President in
forming his administration and the base of political leadership in the executive branch,’ and
appointment of leading legislators to cabinet positions ‘might encourage closer collaboration’
between the branches and ‘help to prevent stalemates.’”2

Overriding Checks & Balances
Lastly, Sundquist proposes providing situational ability of one branch of the federal
government to override the checks and balances the others may place on it. He sees the potential
for this to occur in context of “the weakening of one or more of the veto powers.”3 Yet, just as
quickly as he proposes such reform, he acknowledges that empowering one branch over the
others would not reduce the “disharmony that now so often saps the effectiveness of

1

Stephen Horn, The Cabinet and Congress (Columbia University Press, 1960), page 211 in Sundquist, James L.
Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. Page 232.
2
Committee on the Constitutional System, “A Bicentennial Analysis of the American Political Structure”
(Washington, January 1987), pages 11-12 in Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. Page 233.
3
Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 279.
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government;” such an empowerment merely sidesteps the issue.1 Because separation of powers
would remain in place, the relationship between such a reform and the parliamentary model is
tenuous. Nonetheless, such reform is in the spirit of the unified control and decision-making that
are to be found in Westminster.

In light of the suggestions proposed, should the U.S. enact reforms toward emulating the
Westminster governmental model? Put aside for the length of this work that the abovementioned
reforms will not be enacted, and just think about whether they should happen.
The British government enjoys significant, albeit relative, ease of responsiveness and ability to
act. But how truly easy is that ease of responsiveness? Moreover, is ease of responsiveness
what is needed?

1

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1992. Page 279.
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The Expenses Scandal
There is currently an exhibit at the British Library in London showcasing the evolution of
the English language. From its roots in the single-digit centuries A.D., the exhibit chronicles
evolution of syntax, grammar, word choice, and dialect. A few miles away in the House of
Lords chamber, a word has recently surfaced with increasing regularity that might very well be
on display in the British Library as patently American and emblematic of the stalemate that has
become the norm in American politics. This word is foreign to the British.
The word is filibuster. A concept no American could avoid even if only tuning into CNN
while channel surfing, the filibuster is a hallmark of American democracy. Though the majority
party in the Senate is always quick to complain about the filibuster’s all too frequent exploitation
by those across the aisle to block legislation, they will use it to their advantage the next time
party control shifts. The potency of a filibuster is not restricted to its use: the mere threat of it
requires compromise on legislation that can severely affect the policy output.
The environment in the House of Lords is a different beast altogether. A vestige of the
respect and courtesy that members of the British upper class are meant to exhibit when engaging
with one another, the thought of killing legislation by holding it hostage because one does not
agree with it is justifiably alien. Many Tory peers have nevertheless suggested that is exactly
what Labour was trying to do to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. The
bill calls a referendum on May 5th, 2011, whereby the electorate will decide whether to abandon
the First Past the Post electoral system in favor of an Alternative Vote system. First Past the
Post is a winner-take-all system where the candidate who wins a plurality of votes (not
necessarily a majority) wins the seat; AV entails a ranking system—voters rank candidates and
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first choice rankings are tallied. If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate with the
lowest votes is eliminated and those votes are redistributed to the candidate ranked second on the
ballot. This process is carried out until a candidate receives a majority.
What really concerns Labour about the bill is a provision that would eliminate and
redistrict fifty seats in the House of Commons. Anxious that the government will target
redistricting to Labour’s disadvantage, Labour politicians worry that it will become much more
difficult for them to win future elections. Jon Cruddas, MP for Dangenham and Rainham, goes
so far as to opine that the bill is part of a comprehensive Tory effort to enforce its electoral
majority by systematically disenfranchising the Labour electorate.1 Tories argue that Labour has
been unfairly privileged by the election process to date, and that they simply want to even the
playing field.2
The bill is clearly politically charged and laden with partisan interests. As part of the
Lords’ function to review and scrutinize the legislative efforts of the Commons, it could delay
the bill for up to a year (which, politically, could be a crucially important amount of time); to do
so would, however, be out of fashion for the Lords. That the Lords debated the bill in committee
for seventeen days (on certain days sitting all night in discussion) is reflective of the tense
environment. This mood has also been present at two other times: during responses to the
expenses scandal in 2009 and in the current austerity plan debate. I know because I was there,
inside Westminster, on both occasions.

1
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Background of the Parliamentary Expense System
Self-regulation is a prominent feature of the British political system. This has come
about in a conscious attempt to insulate Parliament from the influence of the Crown. Hugh
Tomlinson QC, a barrister involved in exposing the expenses scandal, suggests that public life
and politics in Britain have therefore become conceptually opaque and closed off from public
scrutiny. A legacy of this opacity has been that MPs have not felt the need to publicly justify
their use of expenses to the public. Then-head of the House of Commons Fees Office, Andrew
Walker, has been quoted as saying that “MPs should be allowed to carry on their duties free from
interference” and that “transparency will damage democracy.”1 In hindsight this disinterest in
revealing expenses may have resulted from the knowledge that many MPs were wildly abusing
the privilege; on an individual level, however, it does not seem entirely illegitimate that MPs
would not share with the public what kind of tea they prefer via receipts from train rides from
constituency to London. Theoretically, where no malfeasance is involved, the legacy of selfregulation and opacity seems justifiable.
In August, 1911, MPs began to receive a yearly salary, set at £400. That number has
steadily increased over the past century. As of April 1st, 2010, it was set at £65,738.2 This is in
contrast with a national salary average of £25,000, which is currently increasing yearly by less
than inflation.3 The politics of wages and finances are made more complicated by the current
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economic climate, with unemployment on the rise at 7.9% nationally and 20.5% for 16 to 24
year-olds.1
With expenses exempt by precedent from the public domain, increases in the overall
amount of money MPs receive have been steered towards expenses. In the 1980’s the Commons
debated increasing MPs salaries. Ultimately it opted instead to increase expenses, which Lord
Jenkin of Roding described as being “politically easier.”2 Whether or not this was the first time
that a stealthy increase in MPs finances occurred, it nevertheless sent the message to MPs that
being less than forthright about compensation is acceptable.

The Fight Over Expense Publication
This background set the stage for a battle between journalists Heather Brooke, Ben
Leapman of the Daily Telegraph, Jon Ungoed-Thomas of the Sunday Times, and the Commons.
Ironically, the impetus for the clash was instigated by the Commons in an effort to add a degree
of transparency to British politics. In 2000 Parliament passed the Freedom of Information Act
2000 (FOI).3 The act’s preamble does justice to its intent: FOI serves to “make provision for the
disclosure of information held by public authorities or by persons providing services for them.”4
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Though FOI achieved Royal Assent in 2000, the act would not come into effect until
2005. Brooke, Leapman, and Ungoed-Thomas were initially interested in testing FOI’s utility.
Brooke was conducting research for an upcoming book entitled Your Right to Know, and
Leapman and Ungoed-Thomas were interested (respectively) in testing FOI’s efficacy.1 As the
act mandates, every entity with information to be requested under FOI provisions must have an
officer to carry out these requests. As anyone who has ever waited in line at the DMV knows,
government bureaucracy is a nightmare. It is, therefore, less than shocking that Brooke had
difficulty navigating the Parliament switchboard to find said officer.2
Eventually locating the FOI officer, Brooke’s request, along with Leapman’s and
Ungoed-Thomas’ requests, was rejected. FOI permits information to be exempted “for the
purpose of avoiding an infringement of the privileges of either House of Parliament.”3 Not only
is the rejection justified by potential security risks (keeping in mind that in the Westminster
model, members of the executive branch are first and foremost members of the legislature, and
so potentially sensitive information related to money spent by the Prime Minister and his/her
team must be carefully guarded), but the opacity element all but guaranteed that Westminster
would not release the information. Whitehall probably did not expect the decision to be
appealed; the need for government privilege and privacy makes sense.
The journalists did appeal. The next step in the process was for them to appeal to
Information Commissioner (an office established by FOI) Richard Thomas, the UK’s
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“independent authority set up to uphold information rights in the public interest, promoting
openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals.”1 The appeals were filed in 2005
and 2006, and Brooke mentions that it is not uncommon for requests to go unanswered for
upwards of a year.2 In June, 2007, Thomas bundled the journalists’ appeals into one decision,
with which no one was pleased. Thomas agreed that the more detailed analysis of MPs’
expenses for which the journalists called needed to be made available. However, his opinion and
decision was that this analysis would best take shape by narrower categorization of expense
claims.3 Affirming FOI’s exemption for parliamentary privilege, the request for publication of
the raw data was rejected.4 Brooke retorted in response that neither would that give her the detail
she needed nor was the Commons interested in complying with narrower categories; to do so
would have caused Westminster more work than publishing the raw data outright.5
As expected, the Commons appealed Thomas’ decision. Likewise, the journalists
counter-appealed. The case was sent to an Information Tribunal in February, 2008.6 The
decision reached on February 26th dealt a critical blow to the Commons. The Commons appeal
was rejected, and the tribunal agreed with the counter-appeal that the full details of MPs’
expenses, receipts included, should be published. Had Parliament ended its battle here and
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complied, public opinion may have been content with the conclusion that the Commons fought
back simply because of the great amount of work Thomas’ remedy would have caused its staff.
Parliament remained discontent, and yet again appealed. At this point one starts to
wonder what the Commons was trying to hide. Brooke stated during an interview with the
Guardian that for the Commons to press further was ill-advised: “either way they look foolish,
incompetent and so wedded to secrecy they throw money away or there is some incredible
scandal they are trying to hide.”1
Brooke was wrong. The Commons did not look incompetent or as though it was trying to
hide from scandal. The Commons looked both incompetent and as though it was trying to hide
from scandal. Under the leadership of the Speaker of the House at the time, Rt. Hon. Michael
Martin MP, the Commons appealed the Tribunal’s decision at the end of March, 2008. In the
effort, Martin’s legal team ran up fees of £150,000.2 On May 16th the High Court (one of the
highest courts of England and Wales) ruled against the appeal, upholding the decision of the
Tribunal. In the decision, the judges stated: “we are not here dealing with idle gossip, or public
curiosity about what in truth are trivialities. The expenditure of public money through the
payment of MPs’ salaries and allowances is a matter of direct and reasonable interest to the
taxpayer.”3
Though the Commons did not publicly pursue the matter further, within Westminster the
wheels began turning to bypass the Court’s authority. After announcing that the House would
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publish all receipts in October, 2008, Julian Lewis, MP for New Forest East, successfully led a
movement to exempt MPs’ addresses from FOI jurisdiction, passed by an order in July, 2008.1
The October deadline passed. Westminster pushed the deadline to December, and again this
deadline passed.
It is likely that the Commons intended to delay publishing expenses until it could
successfully exempt itself completely from FOI. Upon returning from Christmas recess in
January, 2009, the Leader of the House of Commons, Rt. Hon. Harriet Harman MP, led a motion
that would have achieved just that.2 The motion was defeated, and July, 2009 was set as the new
release date for receipts.3

The Scandal
The public could not have expected what was to come. After half a decade of legal
battles and passed deadlines, it is likely the public did not much care anymore (if it ever did).
After all the journalists’ hard work, none of Brooke’s, Leapman’s, Ungoed-Thomas’, or their
legal teams’ efforts directly mattered. In March, 2009, a disk was stolen from the Parliamentary
Fees Office that contained the full details of MPs expense claims. The Daily Telegraph later
acquired that disk, and on May 8th, 2009, the paper published the information.4 Some of the
more egregious offenses include: £25,000 claimed by Rt. Hon. Barbara Follett MP for private
1

Leapman, Ben. “Ben Leapman: My four-year battle for the truth over MPs’ expenses.” www.telegraph.co.uk.
The Telegraph, 10 May 2009. Web. 1 March 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mpsexpenses/5301739/Ben-Leapman-My-four-year-battle-for-the-truth-over-MPs-expenses.html>.
2
Leapman, Ben. “Ben Leapman: My four-year battle for the truth over MPs’ expenses.” www.telegraph.co.uk.
The Telegraph, 10 May 2009. Web. 1 March 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mpsexpenses/5301739/Ben-Leapman-My-four-year-battle-for-the-truth-over-MPs-expenses.html>.
3
Brooke, Heather. “Unsung Hero.” Guardian.co.uk. The Guardian, 15 May 2009. Web. 1 March 2011.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>.
4
Unknown. “MPs’ expenses scandal: the timeline.” www.independent.co.uk. The Independent UK and the Press
Association, 3 February 2010. Web. 1 March 2011. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mpsexpenses-scandal-the-timeline-1888349.html>.

24

security patrols outside her home, £125,000 claimed by Rt. Hon. Stephen Byers MP for repairs
and maintenance on a London home owned by his partner and where he lives rent-free, and
£125,000 claimed by Andrew Rosindell MP for a second home in London while he claimed his
childhood home—where his mother continued to live 17mi. away—as his primary residence.
Some, while not egregious, might raise eyebrows: Rt. Hon. the Lord Reid of Cardowan, during
his time as an MP, claimed expenses for slotted spoons, an ironing board, and a “glittery loo
seat;” Mike Penning MP claimed £2.99 for a stainless steel dog bowl; Bob Laxton MP claimed
£1,049 for a television because, as the Telegraph quotes, he was too busy to shop around. 1
The general public was angry. Their hard-earned tax money was being spent on glittery
toilet seats and unnecessarily nice TVs. This dishonesty (or fraud, or criminal behavior,
depending on how one chooses to look at it) could not have been revealed at a worse a time: a
worldwide economic meltdown had just occurred months earlier on a scale not seen since the
Great Depression. Opinion at the time ranged from furious to disappointed. For some the abuse
was a slap in the face; for others it merely confirmed that politicians are sleazy and dishonest,
fueling disillusionment with politics.
As is typical of a major crisis, the media and the public looked for someone to blame.
The fiasco occurred on Labour’s watch—they seemed a good place to start. What’s more,
efforts by Labour leadership from Martin (who, as the Speaker, was supposed to be partyneutral) to Harman to shield expenses from public scrutiny seemed all the more devious in light
of this new information. Martin’s involvement in the scandal, which had been alleged for many
years, was confirmed; the Guardian quite viciously reported that “the speaker [sic] and Mrs.
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Martin have been plundering the public purse for an almost grotesque array of personal perks
and foreign junkets.”1 Further troublesome for Labour was the fast-approaching end of the
government term, with an election to follow by May, 2010. Even though Tories and Lib Dems
were caught with their hands in the cookie jar as well, in-charge Labour had the biggest target
painted on its back.
The severity of media and public displeasure should not be underestimated. Hugh
Tomlinson describes the scandal explosion as a crucial moment when, had the election happened
at that time, the potential existed for an entire generation of politicians to be swept out as the
electorate vented its frustrations at the ballot box.2 As such, it became difficult even for honest
MPs to escape the witch-hunt. The Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP, at the time the
Leader of the Opposition, was targeted for claiming expenses on candy bars, even though they
were being claimed as part of his staff members’ lunches (a fairly innocuous expense).3 Andrew
Anthony, a journalist for the Guardian, reported that by the end of May MPs were speaking “of a
suicidal atmosphere in Parliament.”4 The likelihood of a total slate cleaning aside, the potential
for such an upheaval highlights a significant difference between British and American politics: in
the American system, the staggering of elections and separation of elections for congressmen,
senators, and the president prevents a crisis from wiping out an entire political incumbency.
Tomlinson makes a further interesting point on the public response apropos of the nature
of the parties. He suggests that precisely because the crisis happened on Labour’s watch, the
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response was more venomous. As the name suggests, Labour’s left-wing and ‘of the people’
heritage suggests that concern for the working middle and lower class of Britain motivates all
that Labour politicians do. In that way they might be considered akin to the Democrats.
Conversely, the Conservative party, on the right of the ideological spectrum, is the promoter of
business and a smaller national government with powers devolved to localities—akin to the
Republicans. Since Labour is seen as the protector of the working-class, it seems all the more
shocking that the theft and expenditure of constituents’ tax money was allowed to occur on their
watch. The implication is that it would have been less shocking if the Tories, as stereotypically
interested in protecting businesses and wealthier Britons, were the ones abusing expense
privileges. From a popular opinion standpoint, there may be some truth to Tomlinson’s
hypothesis. On the other hand, point of view undermines the usefulness of the argument: a
Labour supporter might rationalize the scandal had it occurred during a Tory government by
saying ‘that figures, the Tories are cheats and liars.’ Now flip the situation: a Tory supporter
could just as easily rationalize the scandal occurring under Labour by saying ‘that figures,
Labour are liars and cheats.’ The situation can easily be perceived as shocking or unsurprising
depending on the combination of who was in charge and the partisan bias of the person making
the comment.

The Response
If there was any chance for Labour to turn the situation around and stave off imminent
election defeat in 2010, No. 10 and the Front Bench would have to come up with a good
solution, and fast. For Gordon Brown, the silver lining may have been that if the government
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was able to come back with a good response and frame it properly, Labour might be able to look
at least reactively responsible for dealing with a situation in which the whole House was
involved irrespective of party affiliation. It was an opportunity for Brown to push a
constitutional reform agenda, one in which he had always been interested.
During Tony Blair’s premiership, Blair seems not to have been particularly interested in
constitutional reform, evidenced by his lack of stewardship over the reform efforts put forth
during his time in No. 10. In Tony Blair and the Constitution, Professor the Lord Norton of
Louth charges that “under Tony Blair’s leadership, the British constitution has undergone
extensive change, unparalleled in recent British history, but without the Prime Minister having a
developed view of what form of constitution is desirable for the United Kingdom.”1 In The
Political Quarterly from Winter, 2010, Matthew Flinders categorizes the loss of interest between
1997-2007 by epithet. He terms the period from 1997-2001 “activity,” when reforms included:
devolution to Scotland, England, Wales and London, independent operation of the Bank of
England, and the introduction of FOI. 2001-2005 is titled “fatigue,” characterized by less
aggressive reforms that, through the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, included the creation of
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom—which transferred appellate judicial power away
from the ‘Law Lords,’ the judicial body of the House of Lords that had previously served that
role—and amended the role of the Lord Chancellor by reducing the position’s power (the Lord
Chancellor had previously been the head officer of the House of Lords and the judiciary). The
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last period is “anomie,” with “no significant measures or leadership concerning the future
agenda, direction of constitutional travel or ‘unfinished business.’”1
By contrast, Gordon Brown, even as Blair’s Chancellor, had always been more interested
in constitutional reform. As Chancellor, Flinders chronicles that “Brown had always been more
sensitive to the existence and implications of constitutional anomie, and during the government’s
second term (2001-2005) he signaled his anxieties in a number of speeches and statements in
which he called for a ‘new constitutional settlement.’”2 Perhaps much of the difficulty Brown
found in pushing through such an agenda stemmed from the fact that, as Lord Norton describes,
Blair “generated a set of constitutional changes that do not hang together, and he bequeaths to his
successor an absence of any coherent view of what type of constitution is appropriate.”3
In spite of the difficulties, Brown hit the ground running when he moved from No. 11 to
No. 10. Almost immediately after taking office at the end of June, 2007, the government
published a green paper entitled The Governance of Britain (Cm.7170). Focused on
“constitutional renewal,” the document was broken down by broad categories: limiting the
powers of the executive, making the executive more accountable, re-invigorating British
democracy, and strengthening the link between the citizen and the state.4 From the very
beginning of the document, the paper highlights Brown’s interest in the connection between
citizens and the government, using language such as: “strong bond between people and
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government” and “forge a new relationship between government and citizen.”1 If the effort was
a high priority, Brown should be faulted for letting it stall. Following a report from Summer
2008 (the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill First Report)2 indicating
what should be done in the constitutional reform context, the Constitutional Reform and
Governance Bill (CRAG) that dealt with these issues was not first read in the House of
Commons until July 20th, 2009, after the expenses scandal hit.3
The public seems not to have cared. When Blair moved to Downing St. in 1997, an Ipsos
MORI poll on the issues of importance to the public ranked constitutional reform last among
fourteen issues.4 At the end of Blair’s first term in 2001 (which coincides with Flinder’s “active”
period), subsequent polling revealed that only 5% of the electorate felt that the constitution was a
vote-driving factor.5 Fast forward to expenses scandal aftermath: an Ipsos MORI issues index
poll from June, 2009 recorded that fewer than 1% of the public felt constitutional reform was the
most important issue facing Britain.6
The public may not have cared about constitutional reform, but something had to be
done. Professor Philip Cowley points out that an existential crisis developed.7 Put simply, the
public was fed up with Parliament. What it wanted in response to the scandal, however, was
abstract. It wanted honest MPs who worked for constituents and did not steal from them. It
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wanted MPs to listen and respond to its concerns. How was the government supposed to
translate these notions into action? With only a short time before Parliament went on Summer
recess at the end of June, a remedy needed to be put forward quickly. So the government hastily
attempted to push CRAG through. If MPs could run back to their constituents during the
Summer recess with their heads held high and CRAG in hand to evidence action (albeit
reaction), the hope was that the electoral fallout for Labour, though inevitable, might be
mitigated. What is important in contrast to the American legislative process is that the
government could respond as it saw fit. As the Westminster model operates, if the government
could rally its back benches and Labour Peers behind CRAG, it could shove CRAG through
regardless of what the Tories or Lib Dems had to say about the bill.
Despite the effort made to connect CRAG to the underlying flaws in governance exposed
by the scandal, it was an ideologically wide-ranging bill, as evidenced by the several categories
of governance that it affected. Responding to The Governance of Britain, CRAG “establishes a
statutory basis for management of the civil service; introduces a new parliamentary process for
the ratification of treaties; provides for the end of by-election for hereditary peers; makes
provisions to allow for the suspension, resignation and expulsion of Members of the Lords;
introduces new rules on time limits for human rights actions against devolved administrations;
makes various provisions relating to judicial office holders, including the removal of the Prime
Minister’s role in the process of appointing Supreme Court judges; establishes a new corporate
structure for the National Audit Office and a limit to the term of appointment to the office of
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Comptroller and Auditor General; and introduces measures designed to increase the transparency
of financial reporting to Parliament.”1
Since CRAG was largely tangential to the issues exposed by the expenses scandal, a
more direct response was also necessary. In June, 2009, the government presented to Parliament
a paper entitled Building Britain’s Future (Cm.7654) outlining the government’s overall
response at a “moment of profound change in our country driven by the global economic
downturn and the crisis of trust in our political system.”2 Though broad in the number of issues
on which it touches, Brown’s introduction states that the government’s “first and most urgent
priority as [it] fight[s] for the interests of the British people is to clean up [its politics]. Britain’s
future cannot be built when [its] politics [are] still governed by the rules of a Victorian past.”3
To that end, the paper highlights forthcoming legislation to deal with MPs’ expenses, which
would become the Parliamentary Standards Act (PSA) introduced in the Commons on June 23rd,
2009, and achieving Royal Assent on July 21st, 2009.4 Though PSA and CRAG were quite
distinct in their aims, the two should be thought of as the two centerpieces of the comprehensive
response to the expenses scandal. This point is emphasized in Brown’s introduction to Building
Britain’s Future:
“We stand for a decent, honest politics in this country in which politicians are dedicated to serving the
public, not themselves. We are introducing legislation to create an independent regulator for
Parliamentary standards, and a tough, legally binding Code of Conduct for MPs. Every claim made
by MPs over the last four years will be audited: those who have broken the rules will be held to
1
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account. But we need to go further in responding to the crisis of trust in the political system, opening
up our constitution and Britain’s political institutions to reconnect citizens with our representative
democracy. The task of modernising the British constitutional settlement is not yet complete: we must
be prepared to give power away, reforming Parliament and devolving and decentralising power even
further throughout our country.”1

The legislation that resulted fit this description to a tee. PSA created an independent
body known as the ‘Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority’ (IPSA) to handle Commons
finances, directed IPSA to create a Code of Conduct related to MPs financial interests, and
created an officer called the ‘Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations’ to investigate
alleged misconduct.2

Analyzing the Response
Cowley has suggested that the expenses scandal is an atypical example of a crisis
situation and response with regard to the applicability of the Westminster model in dealing with
problems in the American model.3 Unlike most crises, the expenses scandal was an internal
issue (in contrast to events such as the worldwide economic meltdown in Fall, 2008). Though
there was external involvement, e.g. the three journalists’ efforts and Telegraph leaks, it was
solely internal misconduct that caused the crisis. For this reason, Cowley argues, the scandal led
to an unusual existential crisis in Parliament, with MPs in crisis mode preoccupied with a frantic
effort to find a solution before the House rose for Summer recess. Precisely because this
situation is atypical of a crisis, it provides a unique opportunity to analyze the Westminster
model and the way that it deals legislatively with crises. It presents a raw perspective, as MPs
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had no previous experiences to condition their responses, and reveals how Parliament acts when
it is not sure what to do.
In an analysis of Parliament’s response to the expenses scandal, there are several
questions that should be asked. The first concerns speed. Second, did the scandal expose a need
for the reforms covered by CRAG and PSA? Third, did the reforms put in place by CRAG and
PSA actually signify major policy departure or ideological shifts in the nature of parliamentary
governance vis-à-vis the Westminster model and its Constitution? Fourth, what can be said
overall about the appropriateness of the response politically, given the speed with which the
legislation was pushed to Royal Assent?

Speed
Considering the turnaround time from the first Telegraph leaks in early May, 2009 to
Royal Assent of PSA on July 21st, 2009, the response was rushed.1 Introducing the bill to
committee as the First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. Sylvia Heal MP
referenced “the speed with which the House is being asked to proceed with this bill.”2 This
speed was objected to by the Tories throughout committee debate. As an expert on
Parliamentary voting patterns, Cowley asserts that most MPs remain loyal to the party label and
obey their whips at division. Thus, a partisan divide was clearly present. Objection ranged from
respectful disagreement to diatribe. John Redwood (Con.), MP for Wokingham, “strongly
object[ed] to the time limit on the Bill.”3 Sir Patrick Cormack (Con.), MP for South
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Staffordshire, at first voiced his displeasure over “the serious nature of the Government taking a
Bill of constitutional significance through the House at a gallop and without time to consider and
reflect.”1 His tone later took a dramatically negative turn: “we are here today because of the
Prime Minister, who, in a fit of pique and panic, has introduced an extremely bad Bill to
Parliament… This very bad bill has been foisted on us by the Prime Minister in a spirit of
vindictiveness, malice and uncharitableness. He is a Prime Minister who wishes to tear down
some of the institutions of this country.”2
When the bill moved to the Lords, speed caused similarly opinionated responses (though
obviously less venomous). Keep in mind that PSA’s remedies would not affect the Lords. Rt.
Hon. the Baroness Royall, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Leader of the House of
Lords, opened the second reading of the Bill on July 8th, 2009 by making this point clear:
“nothing in this Bill will affect this House. Nothing in this Bill will impact upon this House.
Nothing in this Bill will change what we in this House do and how we in this House do it.”3
Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market (Con.) puts opposition to the Bill quite eloquently:
“the handling of this matter is little short of disgraceful. It bears all the hallmarks of a knee-jerk
response by a beleaguered Prime Minister in a bunker making legislation on the hoof in response to
newspaper headlines and announcing his quick thought for the day on YouTube. It flies in the face of
all the Government’s own rules for public consultation—I stress public consultation, as distinct from
secret cross-party talks—and adequate time for scrutiny of legislation. It raises serious constitutional
issues as a result of the thoughtless haste with which the Government did the drafting. We see
evidence of that in the continuing response by the Government in making changes and even promising
4
some—if I heard it right—in the next Parliament.”

Even Labour Peers were not unanimously on board with rubber-stamping PSA. Lord Peston
(Lab) suggested that “all the problems can be solved by a simple statement from my noble friend
the Leader of the House [Baroness Royall]. All she has to do is to say that there will be no
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accelerated timetable, and then the Government will have their legislation in October. That is all
she has to do.”1
Rushing reform was also problematic from a procedural standpoint. Cowley rightly
points out that debate over the two bills differed from discussions on other issues because of the
subject matter involved. When parliamentary debates occur on any range of topics, e.g.
healthcare, economics, or education, only a certain number of MPs and Lords will be well versed
on the subject.2 Though many others without such expertise may involve themselves in the
conversation from a political or policy standpoint, they would not be experts in the matter and
would be expected to defer to the experts in debate. However, with regard to expenses and
parliamentary procedure, every MP should be well versed. As such, MPs were clearly interested
in speaking their minds; Chairman Heal had to ask for a “measure of restraint” in the time and
scope of MPs speeches so that as much as possible could be discussed in the allotted time.3 The
stifling of debate certainly ruffled many feathers, making the brevity of scrutiny over the bill all
the more noticeable.
It has been made clear that the response was rushed. Before passing judgment on the
negative implications of the rushed effort, the other questions will be first addressed. Speed will
therefore be discussed again shortly.
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Did the Scandal Expose a Need for Reform?

As the recent Middle East political crises have exposed, a government can only be
effective if it commands the respect of its citizens. That is not to say that the public has to like
the job the government does or like its public servants; there will certainly be many in any
democracy who disapprove of the job the government does. Nevertheless, whether it is labeled
appreciation, respect, or reverence, Americans and Britons by and large accept the necessity of a
government, and are willing to abide living under democratic rule.
The expenses scandal had the potential to seriously undermine the public’s respect for its
government and willingness to be governed by its elected officials. Action needed to be taken,
and CRAG and PSA were the solutions. Recalling the provisions of CRAG abovementioned,
only two were even remotely related to the expenses scandal. The question is whether the
scandal exposed deeper and broader issues, thus requiring the wide-ranging reforms proffered by
CRAG. Ruth Fox of the Hansard Society argues that “many politicians and commentators alike
concluded that a link could be drawn between the visible affliction of the expenses debacle and
the deep-rooted political infirmities that manifested themselves in other areas of our
democracy.”1
Lord Norton disagrees with those cited by Fox. He believes that CRAG and the issues it
attempted to resolve were not salient outside of Parliament.2 Previously mentioned Ipsos MORI
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polling regarding public disinterest in constitutional reform confirms Norton’s point of view.
Even further, he sees the effort by Labour to push CRAG through as an attempt to mitigate
public anger towards a Labour government by deflecting blame away from MPs and towards
structural issues (reminiscent of the Sundquist, Samuels and Shugart arguments). Did the public
agree with this assessment? Hansard Society polling shows that in 2008 “‘only 19% of the
public thought Parliament was ‘working for them.’”1 A survey from 2007 “found that only 34%
of the UK public trusted Parliament.”2 Hansard Society focus group research from 2005 “found
that politics was viewed by the public as ‘the pursuit of an exclusive and disreputable elite of
hypocrites and liars.’”3
There are two ways to interpret this polling data. On the one hand, one could read these
numbers to suggest that the public had been overwhelmingly disillusioned with politics for a
long time. Within that framework, it would be reasonable to suggest that the scandal brought
that disillusionment to a critical mass, turning unhappiness into a demand for action. On the
other hand, the numbers could be read to suggest that the expenses scandal did not reveal
anything new.
If the scandal did reveal a degree of latent discontent with Parliament, the remedy did not
match the ailment. University College, London’s Constitution Unit perhaps stated this
disconnect most boldly in its Monitor newsletter when referring to Brown’s efforts to use the
scandal to push CRAG-type reforms: “the bad judgment came in over-reacting to the scandal,
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promising wide ranging reforms which have nothing to do with the original mischief, and which
have limited hope of being delivered in the remainder of this Parliament.”1 In fact CRAG did
pass, achieving Royal Assent on April 8th, 2010, over a month before the election that would
send David Cameron to Downing St. Professor Cowley aptly describes the reform effort as akin
to hanging ornaments on a Christmas tree.2 The situation was so bad for Labour that they had to
be seen doing anything and everything they could; if the government could make the argument
that a particular reform would in some way deal with the issues at hand (at best) or even that it
would simply aid governance in some way, that reform could be hung on the tree. This is
evidenced by the “inchoate range of options” discussed post-scandal to remedy the situation:
“everything from House of Commons business committee and select committee reform, to a bill
of rights and a written constitution, from electoral reform and an elected second chamber, to
reduction in the voting age and a smaller House of Commons” was proposed.3 By throwing
everything up against the wall, the government hoped at least something would stick.
If what was discussed and ultimately put forward by CRAG seemed to have little to do
with the issues revealed by the expenses scandal, then how could the scandal have exposed a
need for constitutional reform? CRAG’s irrelevance to the scandal would lend credence to the
argument that the response was born out of a political and electoral desire to contain the damage
as much as possible before an upcoming election. Politics is about winning elections, and an
expenses scandal in the wake of an economic meltdown was likely to be the nail in the coffin for
New Labour. What’s more, even though Brown was always more interested in constitutional
reform than Blair, Professor Cowley points out that Brown was not as dedicated to constitutional
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reform post-expenses scandal as he had been previously, making it more difficult to enforce a top
down push of the legislation through Parliament.
However, CRAG was never intended to stand on its own as the sole response to the
scandal. Where CRAG faced difficulties of salience, PSA could be easily understood: it aimed
to revamp the processes by which MPs claimed expenses and by which those expenses were
vetted. Did the expenses scandal expose a need for the reform provided by PSA? A preliminary
question is in order: did the shift from self-regulation to independent oversight mark a significant
policy departure for the British government? On the one hand, recall Hugh Tomlinson’s
argument that Westminster had long operated in an environment of self-regulation. To take that
power away from Parliament and put it in the hands of a semi-independent bureaucracy is, in his
opinion, a major constitutional shift for the UK (keep in mind that the term constitutional is used
more vaguely when applied to the UK, as the British government operates under a constitution
that is decentralized and based on legal precedent).1
There is, however, an opposing argument to consider. Self-regulation works as long as
those entrusted with said responsibility do not abuse it. The system of expense and finance
regulation had broken down long before PSA was enacted. While it may present a major policy
departure on paper, PSA shifts merely to providing the watchdog required by the misconduct. It
cannot be viewed as a major departure in contrast to self-regulation because Parliament had
disposed of self-regulation long before 2009.
While Tomlinson looks at PSA from an ideological point of view, Lord Norton takes a
more pragmatic stance. He questions what will truly change under IPSA control.2 For him,
IPSA is merely another government body investigating MPs’ finances; nothing about what is
1
2

Tomlinson QC, Hugh. Personal Interview. 31 Jan. 2011.
Professor the Lord Norton of Louth. Personal Interview. 3 Feb. 2011.

40

claimed or how it is claimed changes. Of course independent regulation would serve as a barrier
to dishonest expense claims by providing another layer of scrutiny that MPs will not want to
challenge. On the other hand, are MPs who claim for glittery toilet seats and £1,000 television
sets really going to change their behavior because there is a different person looking over their
finances, or are they simply going to find another way around the new obstacle? PSA might not
change very much. Perhaps this was intentional: Parliament gives up some independence to
provide something tangible to showcase to constituents.
Back then to the question of whether the expenses scandal exposed a need for the kind of
reform provided by PSA. The answer to this question depends on whether you agree with
Tomlinson or Norton. It seems clear that while Tomlinson certainly makes an interesting point,
the fact that the Commons itself instigated ideological change by ceasing to care about its own
rules created an environment where regulation was necessary. Thus, IPSA merely put a body in
place to support the environment that the Commons demonstrated it needed to deal appropriately
with the money it doles out to MPs.

Speed Redux
In light of the fact that the reforms put in place by CRAG were in large part tangential to
the expenses scandal and that PSA did not change much of anything, was the speed with which
the government attempted to push these reforms through appropriate? Additionally, was it
appropriate that the government attempted to suggest to the public that the remedies offered in
CRAG and PSA were immediately necessary?
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Among all of the testimony presented, there is no dearth of evidence suggesting that the
response was rushed. Tomlinson, Lord Norton, and Cowley all agree. Not only do they believe
the response was rushed, but also that the response was inappropriate. Tomlinson stated that the
expenses scandal exposed an “inability to react sensibly to popular fuming.”1 As
aforementioned, Cowley posits that there was no proper discussion of how to remedy the
situation because MPs were running around in crisis mode, with which Lord Norton agreed
given his previously cited testimony from Lords debate.
The rush and inappropriateness of the response suggests that it was both political and
electoral. It was political in that the expenses scandal was used as a way to kick CRAG into
motion. The scandal provided a unique opportunity to make the case to both the public and the
media that these kinds of reforms were not just salutary, but necessary with regard to the
shortcomings in the British system of governance exposed by the expenses scandal. The
opportunity would not, however, be properly exploited: as aptly stated by the Hansard Society,
“in prescribing such a wide variety of reform remedies—many of which will simply not be
realised, at least in the short and medium term, due to a lack of policy consensus, political capital
and legislative time—the party leaders risk making the cure worse than the disease.”2
In light of the impending election set to happen anytime before the end of May, 2010—
and which Brown understandably put off as long as possible—the response was also electoral.
Labour had to do whatever possible to avoid being brutally demolished at the ballot box.
Ultimately, the result turned out not to be as bad as it could have been: though Cameron did
move into No. 10, he fell short of an outright majority, and Nick Clegg and the Liberal
Democrats crashed and burned in a matter of weeks in the run-up to the election, despite talk
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during the campaign of a potential outright Lib Dem majority. In retrospect it then becomes
tempting to retort that while the response to the expenses scandal may have been politically and
electorally engineered by Labour leadership, their response worked! This paper is not concerned
with the partisan implications of the outcome. As a matter of public policy, the focus is on the
appropriateness and the level of partisan politicization involved in the legislative process and the
potential effect on policy when legislation can be pushed through.
CRAG and PSA did not restore levels of public confidence in Parliament. Ipsos MORI
polling shows that levels of public dissatisfaction with government (outside of the obvious spike
in the summer of 2009 when dissatisfaction climbed to around 80%) was both pre- and postexpenses scandal at around 2/3 of those polled.1 That figure is generally consistent with
dissatisfaction ratings dating back to 2003.2 Looking at CRAG and PSA from a policy
perspective, with the legislation supposedly intending to deal with broader flaws in the
Westminster model and a breakdown of public confidence in government, the government’s
response did not work; public opinion regarding dissatisfaction with Parliament did not shift.
A perennial question in Political Science is whether the general public should be
considered politically knowledgeable. If so, where are they getting their information and cues?
Following the expenses scandal, the government received so much negative publicity that it
would arguably have been more difficult for members of the general public to stay out of the
know than in. If they read newspapers, watched television, or browsed the Internet, they heard
about pervasive dishonesty in Westminster and a botched response. Researching the issue, I
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have always wondered whether a political and electoral response to the crisis was doomed from
the start by being appreciated as just that. Instead, perhaps the government would have been
better off to respond publicly by saying that it understood the situation was bad and there was a
breakdown in accountability and public trust in Parliament, but that it was not going to rush a
response. If the government had acknowledged that there was an upcoming election yet stated
that it would not try to fit a response in an electoral timeframe, instead opting to appropriately
consider the necessary response to the situation, perhaps the public would have responded to the
honesty. By putting the public above its interest in being re-elected, Labour might have
ultimately been rewarded.
Professor Cowley responds that this was not a viable option. He hypothesizes that the
media and opposition parties would have crucified Labour for its inaction. Nevertheless,
opposition politicians disapproved of the rushed legislative effort and wished instead to see more
time made available for proper discussion. If the more upfront and honest route I have suggested
had been taken, it would have allowed Labour to proclaim publicly that it wanted to pursue a
bipartisan response. The Tories and Lib Dems could not have turned down a public offer; if they
did, Labour could have responded that its opponents were not interested in participating to fix the
problem. Working together would have gone a long way to neutralize the issue as an election
hot topic and insulated Labour from total responsibility for the situation.

Summary
Though the ramifications of the expenses scandal aftermath on the argument for adoption
of a parliamentary system in the U.S. will later be discussed in detail, what should be said at this
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point about the expenses scandal? Parliament can move quickly, and in this situation did. The
detail of the story suggests that speed was not useful in this situation. Labour leadership became
so wrapped up in trying to deal with the situation in an electoral timeframe and out of
consideration for party politics that they seem not to have stopped to consider whether the
agenda they were pushing through was appropriate. Appropriateness refers both to whether the
reforms properly dealt with the flaws in Westminster, and whether the reforms and the speed
with which they were passed were, from a policy perspective, in the best interest of the nation.
The ability to act quickly may appear beneficial at first glance. Without detailed
knowledge of the response, one might reasonably believe that the government’s ability to bring
its agenda to bear on the British people without being derailed by opposition parties should have
allowed the government to focus on the policy free from partisan and electoral influence. From a
partisan and electoral standpoint the solution arguably worked—Labour could have fared much
worse in the election. But this serves as evidence that a parliamentary model of democracy does
not necessarily occupy the moral high ground vis-à-vis the American Federal system.
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The Budget Crisis
In the Fall of 2008, the world faced an economic meltdown spurred by U.S. economic
troubles. The UK was certainly not immune, and found itself with a budget deficit of £160bn.
Compounding the situation, the economy had been sluggish even before global downturn: by the
second quarter of 2008, growth moved into negative territory, becoming worst in Q4 2008 and
Q1 2009.1 On November 3rd, 2008, the European Commission released forecasts for 2009 in
which it indicated that the British economy would contract by 1% while the Eurozone (those
countries of the European Union that use the Euro currency) would avoid recession. Growth
would ultimately move back into positive territory in Q4 2009. In response to the meltdown,
Chancellor Darling announced a stimulus agenda, increasing government borrowing to prop up
the economy—specifically prioritizing housing, energy, and small business.2 The Chancellor
planned to pump a £20bn stimulus into the economy between December, 2008, and April, 2010,
and reduced VAT from 17.5% to 15% from December 1st, 2008 through the end of 2009.
Additionally, tax breaks were targeted to help those on “modest, low, and middle incomes.”3
The crisis would precede the expenses scandal, but was another example of the financial
woes that hit during a Labour-led government. This is not to suggest that Labour caused the
financial meltdown in the UK or globally, but later evidence will suggest that Labour policies
and actions may have exacerbated the negative consequences that the crisis would have on the
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British public. As far as the public is concerned, they expect government to deal with these
issues and, therefore, they fault whoever is in charge at the time when things do not go well. In
the U.S., the meltdown solidified anger against the Republican Party and increased support for
presidential hopeful Barack Obama. Obama’s lead was aided by the fact that John McCain did
not appear extremely knowledgeable on economic issues.
Similar issues existed in British politics. Following the Coalition takeover the
government wanted to distance itself from the big government, high spending environment of the
previous Labour government. In doing so it hoped to excuse itself from responsibility for the
state of the UK’s economy, portraying itself as responsible not for the mess but for the cleanup
effort.
Even in the absence of a financial crisis, Conservative and Labour economic perspectives
differ dramatically. Add to that a massive budget deficit, and the conversation gets significantly
more heated. Despite the fact that “the figures show that Alistair Darling’s strategy was working
well,” the Coalition shifted gears upon taking power in order to pursue a more aggressive
approach.1 Though the Tories and Lib Dems joined forces to create a government after neither
could win an outright majority, the Tories (as the significantly larger party) are the true driving
force behind the Coalition agenda. In October, 2010, Coalition Chancellor Rt. Hon. George
Osborne MP put out the Spending Review 2010 (Cm.7942), where he laid out the Coalition plan
to reduce the deficit and set the British economy back on track. The Review, in addition to using
general Coalition rhetoric, accepts that the necessary cuts will certainly be difficult and will sting
for many, but that they are nonetheless necessary; the alternative would be the British Isles
sinking into the North Sea. Osborne highlights that in “2009 Britain’s deficit was the largest in
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its peacetime history—the state borrowed one pound for every four it spent.”1 To deal with the
deficit the government cut departmental budgets of public spending “other than health and
overseas aid…by an average of 19 per cent over four years.”2 In addition to the cuts, part of the
long-term austerity plan entailed devolving power away from Westminster to localities,
increasing the VAT from 17.5% to 20%, and encouraging the stimulation of the private sector to
recoup losses in the public sector.
The argument does not stop there. Jumping on the bandwagon with the public (or
perhaps partly responsible for creating that bandwagon), the Coalition placed blame for the
situation and the necessity of the cuts squarely on Labour’s shoulders. As the back and forth
between the parties degenerated into childish arguments of ‘yes you did, ‘no we didn’t,’ it
became increasingly difficult to have a mature discussion over the issue at hand and how to solve
it. Ask five politicians whether Labour was to blame for the economic and budget crisis and you
will get seven answers. Ask five politicians anything and you will get seven answers. To avoid
this paper being drawn into such gibing, it is perhaps best to turn to an analysis that appears
even-handed if not correct. The New Statesman puts forth:
“few doubt that the country’s £155bn Budget deficit must be addressed urgently and that Labour
cannot and should not evade responsibility for the depth of the crisis. But there is room for reasonable
disagreement about the pace and severity of fiscal retrenchment and about the balance of tax rises to
spending cuts. The coalition’s refusal to recognise any alternative course and its dismissal of its
critics as ‘deficit deniers’ is intellectually dishonest.”3

What has been involved in urgently addressing the deficit and refusing to recognize alternative
courses of action?
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Regional, Sectoral, and Class Impact
How hard hitting are the reforms? Is there any rhyme or reason to who feels the brunt of
the cuts? According PriceWaterhouseCooper’s Nick Jones and John Hawksworth, “total
discretionary consolidation is forecast to be approximately £113 bn p.a. by 2014-15 (around
6.3% of GDP in that year), of which around £84 bn p.a. (73%) comes from spending reduction
and £29 bn p.a. (27%) from net tax increases, the latter being more heavily front loaded over the
five year period.”1 Based on these figures and those from the Office for Budget Responsibility
(OBR), Jones and Hawksworth expect a loss of 500,000 public sector jobs.2 Combined with
expected private sector losses of around 450,000 during that period, the government will have
been responsible for putting one million people out of work. The Coalition will of course
dispute that, saying that Labour caused the losses. Placing blame for Britain’s economic climate
and its impact on the labor force is not within the purview of this work; assessing the legislative
response is the objective. The fact that there is such dispute and blame throwing between the
parties is significant in what it says about the relative ease of legislating in the UK compared to
the U.S. More on this to come later.
If the Coalition is attempting to be even-handed in how the effects of the austerity plan
will be distributed, they are not doing a very good job of it. PwC finds heavy regional and
sectoral disparity with regard to where those losses will be found. Regionally, Northern Ireland,
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Scotland, Wales, and Northeast England will fare the worst by far.1 Sectoral analysis shows that
social work, public administration, and defense—all of which are heavily publicly funded—will
take the biggest hits, with more detailed loss predictions showing that office machinery,
computers, and weapons and ammunition will see the biggest loss as a percent of sector gross
output.2 To make matters worse, though part of the government’s long-term plan is to devolve
power away from Westminster to localities, a report by the Centre for Cities from January 24th,
2011 argues that struggling localities will “need extra support from central government.”3 The
end result is that by increasing autonomy to localities, they will depend on Westminster further.
For Parliament, the financial implications of outsourcing power to localities yet nevertheless
increasing support for those localities may be greater than they would have been if Parliament
had held onto power. While devolution of power will be ideologically in step for the Tories,
such a power shift would have been easier once stability has returned to the British economy.
There is also evidence for socioeconomic and income class disparity of distribution. The
VAT increase to 20% will have a greatest impact on those for whom expenditure is highest
relative to income—the poorest.4 James Browne of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) cites
that the poorest income decile will see a loss of 2.5% as a proportion of income from the VAT
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hike.1 Beyond tax rises, cuts to governmental departments—reducing the support they can
provide—will hit hardest those who rely on public support.
In contrast to the U.S., in Europe there is a rich post-WWII era history of the welfare
state. Citizens of many European countries expect certain services to be provided to them by the
government, e.g. healthcare. This is the case both in the UK and in countries like France. It is
important to keep in mind that the government will be reducing the efficacy of programs on
which Britons have come to rely, e.g. the NHS. The Los Angeles Times recounts the story of one
British pensioner, Festus Grant, a retired subway driver. Grant suffered a debilitating stroke in
early 2010, spending three months in the hospital. Following his return home, support from the
Stroke Association helped him tremendously. They assigned him a social worker, whose routine
visits helped to get him acclimated to his new lifestyle and assisted him with errands, marketing,
and the like. At the time of publication, support from the Stroke Association was set to be
removed by the end of 2010. Beyond the difficulties Grant would face without such help, he
worried about a secondary threat if the government included his home as it considered “allowing
some public housing rents to rise closer to market rates.”2 In response, Grant says that “‘if they
take more from me… I won’t be able to survive.’”3
What does it mean that expert analysis and stories of pensioners like Grant seem to be
falling on deaf ears? The government either has not or will not consider the unevenness of the
consequences its plan will have on the British public. Browne believes that this negligence is
part of the problem. When asked to assess the degree to which the government has considered
his findings, he replied that they mostly brush them off or try to discredit them. This is not an
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isolated incident: he finds that Parliament tends to ignore independent findings that do not
support the government’s agenda. 1 This is all the more ironic as the government appointed IFS
Director Robert Chote to head up the OBR (an office created by the Coalition government).
Why will the government not listen? It is easy enough to blame Labour for having created the
situation, but, moving forward, the Coalition cannot blame its own unwillingness to consider
outside information on Labour. The Coalition does not want to listen, perpetuating the feeling
that it is all just politics to them. Watch any PMQs between Cameron and Miliband; Labour
repeatedly says the cuts are going “too far, too fast.” Cameron responds by making a joke about
Miliband’s leadership naïveté and points the finger back and says it is Labour’s fault that the
Coalition has to take such a course of action. But again and again this response sees Cameron
avoid dealing with questions concerning the depth and speed of the cuts—all he has done is
engineered an inflammatory sound bite for the 6 o’clock news.
By failing to listen and take outside perspectives into account, sound bites ignore the fact
that many Britons like Festus Grant will not have the ability to weather the storm. As far as
Labour is concerned, the Coalition appears to be mistakenly taking this ability for granted.
Whereas the government’s response to the expenses scandal exhibited timidity, its response to
the financial crisis exhibits wild aggressiveness. Let us look again to the speed with which this
response has been implemented.

Speed
Speed operates here on two levels. The first level references how quickly the
government came up with its plan and implemented it, which is especially important given the
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controversial nature of the plan. On the second level there is the question of how quickly the
government aims to set the economy back on track, and how it strategizes for the short-,
medium-, and long-terms.

First Level
Labour believes the austerity plan goes too far, too fast; the Coalition believes that
Labour left it a situation in which emergency action was needed. Lord Skidelsky (a former Tory
Peer, now a Crossbencher) posits that “if a government is felt to have lost all control, if the size
of the debt is so vast that it threatens immediate default, then a decisive change of policy can
have a decisive effect. Britain was hardly in this position last April [2010], despite all the efforts
of Conservative spokesmen to play up the imminence of the danger facing the country under
Labour rule.”1 He thinks the panic stirred up by politicians was engineered. If one agrees with
the New Statesman perspective that Chancellor Darling’s plan was working, then engineering
through rhetoric seems all the more likely. Consider again the distinction between this response
and the most recent American one—the extension of the Bush tax cuts for all. The U.S. faced a
similarly dire economic crash. Rhetoric has not been so concerned with Armageddon in the
U.S., nor have the actions America has taken been so dramatic in the sense of having negative
effects on Americans. One could respond that this difference is explained by Congress’ having
been led by the Democrats in both the House and Senate at the time of response (whereas the
Conservatives are in charge in Britain and therefore less likely to respond with big government
stimuli). Do not forget, however, that the U.S. stimulus package that likely saved the country
from an even bigger problem was a product of the Bush White House.
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James Browne targets a key distinction between the U.S. and UK that legitimizes the
difference in response. There is a sizable difference between the percent of foreign exchange
reserves held in USD ($) vs. GBP (£), 62.2% to 4.3% in 2009, respectively, rendering the dollar
more stable than the pound.1 There was therefore a realistic concern that if the UK did not deal
with the situation in due haste, it might not be able to finance its debt and could have become the
next Greece.2 That may have been the case in October, 2008, but again attention should be
pointed to Darling’s plan supposedly working before Osborne moved to No. 11. Even in
October, 2008 the situation may not have been as dire as Tories like to portray it: David
Blanchflower writes for the New Statesman that “according to the Chancellor, George Osborne,
the country had run out of money and was close to bankruptcy, and the cuts of over £80bn were
fair. This was all spin. We were never close to bankruptcy; the country has not run out of
money and the cuts are unfair.”3
Clearly, the speed of the recovery was not absolutely necessary (at least based on
testimony that does not unanimously suggest it was). If the Coalition was able to convince the
public that the speed was necessary to stave off impending doom, then it makes sense that they
did not have time to consider outside analysis and those in positions similar to Festus Grant: the
situation needed to be dealt with immediately, and the government had already done its analysis
and decided its plan was in the best interest of the country. If the situation was not in reality as
bad as the Coalition made it seem, a fuller discussion could at the very least have given
Parliament more time to analyze the situation and consider the short- and long-term implications
of the austerity plan ultimately enacted.
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Second Level
What can be said of the speed with which the budget cuts and tax increases would hit as
part of the Coalition effort to fast track the recovery process? Browne notes that the respective
Labour and Tory plans and rhetoric for recovery are not all that different; the biggest distinction
between them is not over what they would change to reduce the deficit but over the pace of their
plans. Troublesome for the Coalition’s more aggressive timeline is what Nick Jones has
commented as the “lack of concrete planning at the time of the [2010] Spending Review
announcement on how to effect transition in the short-term and the implications for rebalancing
the economy sectorally and regionally.”1 If the austerity plan is successful, regained stability
will not be realized for some time. This seems a risky political move for the coalition. Whereas
staggering of elections in the U.S. prevents tides from sweeping out a political incumbency as
Hugh Tomlinson hypothesized could have happened post-expenses scandal, British politics has
no such insulation. If the time horizon for the Coalition plan is more than five years, it risks
being kicked out for failing to deliver on its promises by the next election.
Tory and Lib Dem control is even more precarious in light of the great deal of
controversy surrounding their fiscal plans. A majority of the British public is to be found in
middle- and low-income classes and is most vulnerable to the impact of the austerity plan. These
people are actively being pushed away from the Conservative and Lib Dem parties; if things
have not gotten better for them by 2015 it would not be unreasonable to expect them to reflect
their discontent at the ballot box. This is especially true for the Lib Dems: Tony Benn warns that
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coalitions are always more damaging to the more progressive of the two parties. 1 Couple this
with the fact that the Lib Dems have reneged on significant (and easy to comprehend) campaign
platform promises, e.g. not raising student tuition fees, and their footing may be highly unstable.
Consequently, Will Straw of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) believes the
government is making a “strategic mistake,” and expects that “the coalition [sic] will take a hit at
each subsequent set of local elections (which take place every May) as well as in the Welsh and
Scottish elections in May 2011 and the European elections in May 2014.”2
The fact that these considerations have not been the first priority for the government
supports the Coalition argument that their plan is not politically motivated. Certainly the
Coalition is doing what it truly feels is right, and does not want Labour or outside opinion to
undermine its mandate to rule and handle the crisis. Neil O’Brien of Policy Exchange agrees.
He asserts that precisely because the government can pass what it likes through Parliament, it
would be easy enough for it to pass a cut package that leaves poor people (who are less likely to
vote) to fend for themselves while simultaneously beefing up electoral support by enacting
electoral reform to help ensure future election wins.3 He believes one could look to any number
of examples where the executive used the legislature and parliamentary procedure to win seats
(e.g. cutting funding to hospitals in safe opposition constituencies rather than in contested ones).
Jon Cruddas believes that, on the contrary, the Coalition is doing exactly what O’Brien
says it is not, using political procedure to disenfranchise the poor and secure its continued
electoral success. He sees the austerity plan as consciously intending to dismantle safety nets for
the poor as part of an overall Tory effort to redefine electoral politics. By systematically
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targeting and disenfranchising Britain’s poorer citizens, eliminating and redistricting fifty
Commons’ constituencies, standardizing the size of constituencies, and abandoning First Past
the Post for AV, the Tories are using their legislative power to effect long-lasting changes to
secure their governmental control and offset potential retrospective voting against the austerity
plan in 2015 and beyond.
If Cruddas is right in his appraisal of the situation, it would make sense that there is not a
lot of room for bipartisan discussion on the matter. The Coalition will push its fiscal agenda
through to the dismay of Labour. On the other hand, what if Cruddas is off base (certainly a
possibility given that his opinion is fairly dramatic)? What if, as O’Brien says, the Coalition is,
and has gone to great lengths to be, even-handed in its distribution of austerity plan pain? If the
Coalition was truly interested in being even-handed, it would at least consider outside experts.
Even if Labour is fully to blame for the fiscal crisis, there is a disconnect between wanting to do
what is best for the country and the spiteful rhetoric that flies across the despatch boxes.

Perception
Despite what the Coalition, Opposition, and experts within and outside of Westminster
are saying, does it really matter what the Coalition plan is? How many members of the public
keep up to date with statistically detailed reports from PwC or IFS’ PowerPoints? Not likely
very many. However, most people watch television, and the media can digest the information
and spit it out in laymen’s terms for the public. Benn is confident that the most important factors
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in motivating how a government is received are public and media opinion.1 The two are surely
linked. O’Brien points out that perception has the power to shape policy, a prime example being
the Tory decision to replace Margaret Thatcher in 1990 in response to unpopular policies such as
the Poll Tax to support local governments and dissent within her administration over views on
integration of the UK into the European Community.2
How, then, has public perception crystallized around the austerity plan? Browne takes a
pragmatic view, stating rather bluntly that “the Coalition will be unpopular in the next few years.
They’ll have to show that they’ve got us through the whole crisis.”3 He is willing to give the
Coalition the time to prove itself—or at least believes that they will have until the next election
to do so. Despite the thought that a majority of the public might rally against the Coalition,
Economist polling from October 18th, 2010 shows that popular opinion “is not overwhelmingly
negative... 60% of voters regard the cuts as unavoidable, and 48% blame Labour for them. They
also seem braced for the impact: 49% expect public services to get a little worse as a result of the
cuts, and 35% expect them to get much worse.”4 Of course, there will be many demographics
that do not share those ‘average’ opinions found by such polling. Trade unions have held rallies
against the plans, senior military officials are angry about the cutbacks forced upon them, and
local governments are vocal against cuts to their budgets.5
With public opinion varied, it would make sense that much of public and media
perception depends on the extent to which a negative assessment of Coalition policy is
successfully presented by Labour. Perhaps this is why the parties have not worked together. For
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as much as it makes the Coalition’s job easier to blame its actions on past Labour missteps, it is
in Labour’s interest to stand on the sidelines if the plan does not work (as it thinks it will not) to
avoid blame and be ready to receive angry members of the public into the Labour party.
Standing apart and refusing to cooperate with one another is crucially important for the parties: if
the public is to take its cues from the media and decide with which point of view they agree,
venomous bickering at sound bite levels will be most easily comprehended. The back and forth
across the despatch boxes and in the media of ‘we’re right, you’re wrong, stick with us!’ will
thus continue to be the dominant form of inter-party rhetoric. As the plan unfolds, however, Will
Straw feels that shifting popular support may encourage the Coalition “to change course and
adopt more of Labour’s policies.”1
How has Labour fared? Recent Ipsos MORI polling shows Labour as the most liked of
the three major parties: 45% of respondents are pleased with Labour, compared to 37% and 40%
for the Tories and Lib Dems, respectively.2 On leadership, however, the situation is reversed:
the same poll ranked Ed Miliband least liked of the three party leaders, trailing Cameron’s 47%
and Clegg’s 40% with 36%.3 Labour’s negative but ineffective response to the tripling of
student tuition fees suggests that public response seems to be more in line with polling of the
party leaders (where Ed Miliband is regarded least highly) than with polling of the parties
themselves (where Labour is regarded most highly). Clegg warned during the election campaign
that there would be “‘Greek-style unrest’ if the Conservatives pushed through savage spending
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cuts on the back of a slim electoral mandate.”1 This was a motivating factor in the youth support
that the Lib Dems enjoyed during the campaign. After the Lib Dems voted for the trebling,
students justifiably felt betrayed, taking to the streets in a series of events ranging from protests
to riots. Many students have subsequently disowned the Lib Dems; they are not likely to be so
keen on the Tories, either. The New Statesman has described Labour’s inability to capitalize on
the situation: “during his campaign for the Labour leadership, Ed Miliband spoke frequently of
his desire to reach out to grass-roots activists and to lead a movement rather than a party. “But
since the protests began, Labour has missed countless opportunities to act as a receptacle for a
new generation of activists.”2 Action could have resonated beyond students: “a YouGov poll
published on 5 December [2010] showed that 49% of voters are opposed to the coalition’s tuition
fees policy, with just 38% in favour.”3 If Labour cannot latch on to popular opinion against an
unpopular Coalition policy that has received a heavy amount of press, the prospect for their
rallying public support more generally is fairly grim.
Even if Labour was doing a better job rallying the public, would its efforts really
resonate? Keep in mind that Labour’s credibility took a pounding in the summer of 2009. It is
possible that the public is not yet ready to accept Labour as the protector of the taxpayer’s wallet
because the image of Labour’s hands in their wallets is so fresh in memory. That Labour has
polled most liked of the parties could simply signify expected higher public discontent with the
in-power parties—the Tories and Lib Dems. In discussion of the matter, Lord Norton posits that
there is certainly carryover in public discontent with Parliament from the expenses scandal,
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compounded by budget cuts and tax increases.1 Thus, a large part of Labour’s ability to
transform discontent with the Coalition into Labour support may depend on the extent to which,
and for how long, any discontent remains targeted at Labour.

Where the UK Stands Now

Roger Bootle of The Telegraph is of the mind that it is simply too early to analyze
whether or not Cameron, Osborne, and their team have handled the mess appropriately.2 At the
time of this writing the majority of the budget cuts have not yet come into effect; with cuts
scheduled to take effect in a matter of weeks following the recent March 23rd, 2011 budget, many
are currently holding their tongues and keyboards. Causing further anxiety is the fact that UK
“GDP contracted by 0.6% in the final three months of last year [2010].”3 Osborne is fond of
pointing out that the UK had an unusually nasty winter, with snow bringing the country to a halt
for several days and negatively affecting the economy.4 When the cuts do come into effect, will
they cause a rebound in the economy or a further contraction? External factors such as
instability in the Middle East and the ensuing effect on oil prices add to the uncertainty.
Having released his new budget on March 23rd, 2011, not much seems to have changed in
the Chancellor’s point of view. This serves to further cement that the Coalition’s plan—both
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good and bad—was not merely a rushed blip, but a long-term plan that will not change. Shamik
Das of Left Foot Forward (LFF) highlights that the new budget delivers “little cheer for students,
the poor, those on low-to-middle incomes, people in a job, people without a job… basically
everyone, save for big businesses who will benefit from the chancellor’s [sic] slashing of
corporation tax—depriving the Treasury of £11.2bn over the next four years.”1 As the name
implies, LFF carries a left-wing bias. To validate its opinions, the Independent’s Johann Hari
argues that “this was a budget that abandoned everything we have learned about economics since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. We discovered then that in a recession, consumers—quite
rightly—cut their spending and save more. But if the Government does the same thing at the
same time then nobody is spending and the recession gets worse… John Maynard Keynes [is]
spinning and howling in his grave.”2

Summary
In contrast to the expenses scandal, analysis of the austerity plan benefits neither from
hindsight nor from being devoid of external influence. In terms of the financial crisis, it is more
difficult to analyze the plan and its potential long-term effects, as future external geopolitical and
economic events will impact the British economy in ways that cannot be predicted. From a
purely policy and legislative perspective, however, the response to the crisis again highlights a
less than ideal response from Westminster to address a crisis situation. There are question marks
regarding whether the austerity plan is the best course of action and whether the short-term hurt
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will be fully offset if long-term planning pans out as the Coalition expects. One thing is certain:
in the face of uncertain and complicated economic conditions, considering opposing points of
view (if not compromising on the plan) would have been beneficial. The ramifications are
simply too important to leverage an entire citizenry’s well-being on measures inspired by hubris.
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Conclusion: Takeaway for the U.S.
“The handling of this matter is little short of disgraceful. It bears all the hallmarks of a knee-jerk
response by a beleaguered Prime Minister in a bunker making legislation on the hoof in response to
newspaper headlines and announcing his quick thought for the day on YouTube. It flies in the face of
all the Government’s own rules for public consultation—I stress public consultation, as distinct from
secret cross-party talks—and adequate time for scrutiny of legislation. It raises serious constitutional
issues as a result of the thoughtless haste with which the Government did the drafting. We see
evidence of that in the continuing response by the Government in making changes and even promising
some—if I heard it right—in the next Parliament.”

– Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market in House of Lords debate, July 8th, 2009
Though the above was spoken with regard to the expenses scandal, it could just as easily
be discussing the response to the budget crisis. It is of note because, among all the expert
testimony presented within these pages, it is the most eloquent criticism of Westminster’s less
than honorable handling of crisis situations. Further, it serves as prime evidence as to why the
U.S. would not necessarily be better off for having enacted parliamentary-style reforms.
Tony Benn believes that in spite of structural governmental differences between the U.S.
and the UK, the two systems are not all that different. Pondering the disparities between the two
nations, Lord Norton sees no reason why the U.S. could not operate under a parliamentary
model;1 described by the UK’s Political Studies Association as the “‘greatest living expert on
Parliament,’” and having spent time in the U.S.—where he received an M.A. degree from the
University of Pennsylvania—his conclusion must be accepted as valid.2 The basis for
comparison therefore exists to validate the potential described by Sundquist in the opening pages
of this chronicle that the U.S. could, absent constitutional impediments, adopt reforms to see it
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Unknown. “PSA Awards 2008.” www.psa.ac.uk. Political Studies Association, n.d. Web. 1 March 2011.
<http://www.psa.ac.uk/Content.aspx?ParentID=2&SearchID=1002008>.
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operate more like a parliamentary system. Having since described Parliament’s legislative
response to two crises, the original question may now be posed once again: would the U.S. truly
be better off if its government operated more like a Parliament?
A crucial point to keep in mind is that the question does not imply a binary response,
though Sundquist, Samuels, and Shugart may believe it does. It is not as simple as saying one
system is right and the other is wrong, either holistically or at the facet level. However, as if
strolling down the lane of a supermarket and placing listed items in the basket, the authors pick
and choose pieces of the parliamentary system from which they believe the U.S. would, from
governmental and public policy angles, benefit. By falsely assuming that the issues associated
with governance in America are symptoms of structural rather than cultural deficiencies, they fail
to notice the similar influence of partisan and electoral consideration that negatively impacts the
legislative process and policy output in the UK. That British politics likewise suffers from the
same two of the biggest obstacles to providing good policy and governance, that those obstacles
have become more problematic in recent history, and that those obstacles exist in both the U.S.
and UK despite the structural differences that enable them, should evidence the fact that the
underlying problems on both sides of the pond are more cultural than structural. For Washington
to nevertheless benefit from a closer structural resemblance to Westminster, America would have
to find itself in a position where the pros and cons associated with a relative inability to progress
and evolve are fundamentally outweighed by the pros and cons associated with the ability to act
swiftly and decisively.
Do the British pros and cons outweigh the American ones? As aforementioned, abuse of
legislative procedure such as the filibuster (which is, ironically, constitutionally unprotected
though many Senators embrace it with incredible fervor) and a loss of collegiality in Congress in
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recent years suggest that we have indeed reached this point. Would we be better off if our
system of government did not enable status quo to a fault? Most likely. In that case, would the
U.S. not benefit from at least getting something done? This argument presupposes that flawed
action is superior to inaction or delayed action. As Whitehall’s responses to the expenses
scandal and financial crisis demonstrate, this presupposition is false. The expenses scandal was
followed by an irrelevant (CRAG) and insignificant (PSA) response that revealed a degree of
consideration for partisan and electoral ramifications and, as evidenced by polling, did not
address the public’s discontent with Parliament. The response to the financial crisis showcases a
response that sacrificed expert analysis and balanced ideology in favor of continued vitriol from
opposing benches. In both situations a more thoughtful and ideologically balanced response
would have been preferable.
From the party perspective, while stagnation promotes discontent among members of
Congress who are apt to blame the other party for their inability to legislate, swiftness and speed
promote similarly venomous inter-party animosity in Britain and lead to a great deal of finger
pointing. Because of unified party control of the branches of government in the UK, it is easier
to place blame on one identifiable entity (the party). As finger pointing during expenses scandal
and financial crisis responses demonstrates, a fine line is easily crossed in such a system where,
among the brouhaha of “he said, she said” and “I’m right, you’re wrong,” everything gets
wrapped up in these black and white portrayals of events. David Cameron’s new year’s message
at the end of 2008 while he was Leader of the Opposition (following the financial meltdown)
provides a typical example:
“That is how we will rebuild our broken economy and our broken society—business by business,
family by family, community by community. Not through imposing some kind of state blueprint from
above, like Gordon Brown wants to do, but by allowing the talent and effort and incredible character
of British people to shine. That is the greatest source of hope we have. That is why I’m optimistic
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about our country’s future. And that is why we need change now.”

1

For context, this paragraph was bookended by an opening paragraph referring to Emperor
Hadrian of Rome who suggested that Rome would be rebuilt after a devastating fire brick by
brick and a subsequent paragraph that goes into a diatribe against Labour. Never mind the fact
that a state blueprint with absolute notions of what must be done is exactly what Chancellor
Osborne has put forward; so, what is Cameron actually saying here? If the sophomoric
paraphrasing may be pardoned—if only to highlight the paragraph with humor: ‘we’ll fix the
British economy by caring about each person. Labour is bad, they think they have all the
answers. Don’t forget what your mother told you—you are special! Because you’re special,
we’ll get out of this mess. Because you’re special and that’s why we’ll get out of this mess,
that’s why we need to ditch Labour. Labour is evil. Did I mention Labour is bad news?’
This style works in a parliamentary system. Not only do the two sides not have to get
along, but if the opposition is going to be left out by controversial policies that they cannot stop,
at least they can kick and scream and draw attention to themselves. Is this really the kind of
system with which America would be better off? Are things not bad enough already with our
state of politics that we should risk heightening partisan animosity?
By many yardsticks both U.S. and UK systems of government appear to have become
morally bankrupt. That is not to say that democracy does not work. I am an optimist, and I
remain confident that it only takes a new generation of politicians to break out of the system to
fix it. Perhaps the leaks in the boat will never be plugged, but they could be. To all the
pessimists sitting in the boat shaking their heads while it sinks and saying “I told you so,” I
would retort that there are too many problems on this planet to make the fall of democracy a self1

Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP, Leader of the Opposition. “Cameron: Labour’s debt crisis is the past.”
www.politics.co.uk. politics.co.uk, 30 Dec. 2008. Web. 1 March, 2011. <http://www.politics.co.uk/speakerscorner/issue-of-the-day/cameron-labour-s-debt-crisis-the-past-$1257649$1257647.htm>.
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fulfilling prophecy.
At the same time, I’m also a pragmatist. Perhaps the final word is that despite all of the
reasons why the U.S. would not necessarily be better off operating more like a parliament,
pragmatism, backed by all of the evidence provided herein, should immediately tell us that
parliamentary-style reforms are not worth our consideration. Something needs to be done, and
our efforts need to be focused where they can make a difference.
America should not be wasting time with suggestions that do not help. With a greater
degree of resemblance to Westminster, all the U.S. will have done is replaced some familiar
problems with unfamiliar ones. Further, the argument towards deficiencies being structural in
nature is, despite best intentions, counter-productive. By ignoring cultural deficiencies or
suggesting that they are not the true problem, politicians are not being held accountable for
abusing powers that, while intended to protect the U.S., are in fact hurting it. To say that the
system is broken and should be replaced seems a cop-out.
Lastly, the argument in favor of parliamentary reforms gets America nowhere. The
American federal system will not change, and should not—at least not to a parliamentary model.
American Political Science, and all Americans, would benefit from experts spending less time
searching for answers to why the state of political affairs is so bad and spending more time
searching for plausible ways to improve the situation. Instead of moving the goal posts, let us
figure out how to work within the boundaries we have.
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